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A concise history of the 
Dutch monarchy
The origin of the State of the Netherlands can be placed in 
1579. Thanks to the help of Prince William of Orange, also 
named William the Silent, the Northern Low Countries 
joined forces in the Union of Utrecht in the freedom strug-
gle against Spain. In 1581 Philip ii of Spain was abjured by 
the Declaration of Independence. After 1648 the Netherlands 
was recognized as an independent power. From 1579 till 1795 
the Dutch Republic was a confederation of seven sovereign 
provinces. The organs of the general government were the 
States General and the Stadholder (Dutch: stadhouder; liter-
ally: locum tenens, the person holding the place of the king), 
the chief political and military leader, very often a member 
of the House of Oranje-Nassau. These organs were formally 
subject to instructions from the Councils of the Provincial 
Estates. In 1795 there was an anti-aristocratic ‘velvet revolu-
tion’ in the Netherlands, inspired by the French Revolution, 
and the stadholder was forced to leave the country. Under 
French inﬂuence the sovereign powers of the provinces were 
dismantled and the Netherlands became a unitary state. The 
‘Batavian Republic’ was recognized by France as an independ-
6ent state, but came to an end in 1806, when Louis Napoleon 
assumed government over the Kingdom of Holland. Because 
Emperor Napoleon was not satisﬁed with the government of 
his brother Louis as King of Holland, the country was incor-
porated into the French Empire in 1810. 
After Napoleon’s losses in 1812 and 1813 the Dutch regained 
control. The Dutch freedom movement led by G.K. van 
Hogendorp invited Willem Frederik van Oranje-Nassau, 
son of the last stadholder William v, living in England, to 
return to the United Netherlands. Willem Frederik arrived 
by boat at Scheveningen on 30 November 1813. By procla-
mation of 2 December 1813 he accepted the title ‘Sovereign 
Prince’ (soeverein vorst). The 1814 Constitution of the United 
Low Countries refers to Willem Frederik van Oranje-Nas-
sau also as ‘Sovereign Prince’, but in 1815 Willem Frederik 
accepted the title of King. In that year an amendment to the 
Constitution of 1814 changed the title of Sovereign Prince to 
King. The name of the state changed into the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands. In the Constitution of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands of 1815 the Northern and Southern Low Coun-
tries were united, although in the procedure the Belgian 
no-show voters were counted among those voting in favour. 
The Congress of Vienna wanted to have a powerful country 
on the northern borders of France.1 
The rule of King William i in the constitutional monarchy, 
who reigned with enlightened despotic features from 1814 
until 1840, was centralistic and autocratic. An uprising in 
Belgium in 1830, inﬂuenced by revolutionary sentiments in 
France, led to the secession of Belgium. Structural reforms 
of the Dutch constitutional monarchy, like full ministe-
7rial responsibility (the motion of no conﬁdence had not yet 
been introduced), inviolability of the king and direct elec-
tion of the Second Chamber of Parliament, only appeared in 
the liberal revision of the Dutch Constitution in 1848. That 
the Dutch monarchy survived in 1848. was in part because 
King William ii, who reigned from 1840 until 1849, was 
impressed by the democratic revolutions across Europe. 
The King had to accept the constitutional reforms proposed 
by the liberal statesman J.R. Thorbecke. His son, the auto-
cratic King William ii, reigned from 1849 until 1890 and had 
a bad relationship with Parliament. In the years 1866-1868 
the Second Chamber or Lower House managed to get con-
trol over government with the introduction of the motion of 
no conﬁdence, changing the constitutional monarchy into 
a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. In 
the Netherlands the responsibility for governing the coun-
try rests with the cabinet on behalf of Parliament. In 1879 
King William iii married Emma van Waldeck-Pyrmont. On 
31 Augustus 1880 their daughter Wilhelmina was born, who 
was queen from 1890 until 1948. During World War ii she 
provided strong moral leadership from London and became 
a sort of national ‘mother’ for the Dutch people. 
Wilhelmina’s daughter Juliana reigned as queen from 1848 
until 1980. The Dutch people strongly identiﬁed with the 
human side of Juliana. In the Netherlands, a more or less 
fragmented society, the monarchy provides symbolic unity 
and continuity. The governance of the country is in the hands 
of the government, not the monarch itself but the monarch 
plus the Council of Ministers or one minister. The relations 
with the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba were enshrined in 
the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1954). The 
8investiture of Juliana’s daughter Beatrix took place in 1980. 
Queen Beatrix carries out her task very seriously and is aware 
of the constitutional rule that all actions of the Crown must 
be approved by Parliament. She plays a role in the opening 
of Parliament, presides over the Council of State, signs all 
laws, receives the heads of diplomatic missions, represents 
the state abroad, and is allowed to play a role in the cabinet 
formation.
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Organization and conduct 
of the Dutch monarchy
Rights of accession
Article 24 of the Dutch Constitution states that the founder 
of the royal family is King William i, Prince of Oranje-Nas-
sau. Article 1 of the Statute states that the throne shall pass 
through inheritance to Her Royal Highness Juliana, Prin-
cess of Oranje-Nassau and thereafter to her lawful progeny. 
Effectively, the meaning of Article 1 of the Statute is the 
same as that of Article 24 of the Constitution. Article 5 of 
the Statute refers to the Constitution for the rules of acces-
sion. These were amended in the constitutional revisions of 
1815, 1887, 1922, 1963 and 1983.
Some European countries adopted the Salian system, 
which debarred women from acceding to the throne. Oth-
ers applied the Castillian system, whereby, in equal degrees 
of blood relationship to the deceased monarch, males take 
precedence over females and older males take precedence 
over younger males. If the male heir predeceases the mon-
arch, his heirs are then next in line to the throne, even if 
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there are no males among them. In the Dutch Constitution 
of 1887 the throne passed by primogeniture to the sons and 
further male heirs in the direct line of descent from William 
I with right of representation and with the older line tak-
ing precedence over the younger line and the older branch 
taking precedence over the younger. In the absence of male 
heirs the throne passed to the oldest surviving daughter of 
the deceased monarch and otherwise to his heirs through 
the female line. If there were no heirs, the throne then 
passed to princesses of Oranje-Nassau in the indirect lines 
of descent from King William i, and ﬁnally to the heirs of 
Princess Caroline van Oranje, sister of stadholder Willem v 
and spouse of the Prince of Nassau-Weilburg.
Queen Wilhelmina succeeded her father in 1890 because 
there was no male heir. As Wilhelmina only had one daugh-
ter, Juliana, the throne would in all likelihood pass to col-
lateral relatives in the form of German princes. This situa-
tion led, in 1922, to a restriction in the rights of accession 
through the female line, whereby collateral relatives of 
Queen Wilhelmina were excluded from hereditary succes-
sion. When the Constitution was revised in 1963 the Castil-
lian system was adopted to conﬁrm the principle that the 
dynasty would also be continued through the female line. In 
the revision of 1983 the precedence of sons above daughters 
was abandoned.
Under Article 25 of the current Constitution the throne 
passes to the legitimate descendants of the deceased or abdi-
cated king in order of seniority with substitution governed 
by the same rule. Article 26 states that, for the purposes of 
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succession, a child that is still in the womb upon the death 
of a monarch is deemed to have already been born. If it is 
stillborn, it is deemed to have never existed. Article 27 states 
that succession upon abdication follows the rules set out in 
the preceding articles. Children and further issue born after 
the abdication are excluded from succession.
Article 28 states that if the king or anyone in the line of suc-
cession marries without having obtained approval by Act 
of Parliament, he abdicates or renounces hereditary succes-
sion. The States-General meet in plenary session to consult 
and decide on a proposal to grant such permission.
Around the time when the engagement was announced 
between Prince Johan Friso, the second son of Queen Beatrix, 
and Mabel Wisse Smit, it emerged that Mabel Wisse Smit 
had been acquainted with the drugs dealer Klaas Bruinsma. 
In October 2003 Prime-Minister Balkenende announced that 
the government would not submit a request to the States-
General to approve the intended marriage. As a result of the 
government’s decision, Johan Friso forfeited his right to the 
throne. He is now no longer a member of the Royal House, 
though he is still a member of the Royal Family. It was not 
the relationship with Bruinsma that scuppered parliamen-
tary approval, but the fact that the Prime-Minister had been 
given ‘incomplete and inaccurate information’.
In the event of exceptional circumstances, such as seri-
ous physical or mental defects, the government may, under 
Article 29, submit a proposal to exclude one or more persons 
from the line of succession. Any such proposal requires a 
two-thirds majority of the votes cast before it can be adopted 
by the States-General in plenary session.
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What if the monarch is unlikely to have an heir, or dies 
without one? Should an heir or monarch be appointed? Or 
should the monarchy be abolished? The Constitution of 
1983 supports the principle that the current system of gov-
ernance be retained. A two-thirds majority of the votes in 
a plenary session of the States-General is required for the 
appointment of a successor. But an impasse could develop 
if there were no two-thirds majority to appoint a successor 
or to introduce the necessary constitutional amendments to 
pave the way for a republic. Article 30 states that, in such 
circumstances, the States-General must be dissolved and 
that a decision should be taken in a plenary session of the 
newly elected chambers.
 The abdication procedure is set out in Article 27, which 
states that an heir to the throne cannot abdicate in advance. 
Queen Wilhelmina abdicated on 4 December 1948 at the age 
of 68, Queen Juliana abdicated on 30 April 1980 at the age of 
71. The abdication documents were countersigned by mem-
bers of the cabinet at that time even though, strictly speak-
ing, according to the Constitution, there was no need for 
a Royal Decree. That said, it is prudent to execute an abdi-
cation by Royal Decree – i.e. with counter-signatories – as 
it gives formal expression to the principle of ministerial 
responsibility.2
Accession occurs immediately upon the death or abdication 
of the monarch: ‘The King is dead, long live the King!’ or 
‘The King never dies’.                                                                                  
 The succession is governed by the principle of continuity 
and takes place by operation of law (Article 32). This means 
that the swearing in and inauguration do not have any inde-
pendent legal effect. In the Netherlands monarchs are not 
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crowned but invested as heads of state. According to the 
Constitution, the investiture must take place in Amsterdam 
at a public joint session of the First and Second Chamber of 
the States-General. Investiture takes place in Amsterdam 
(the capital) to compensate for the fact that the seat of gov-
ernment is in The Hague. The monarch swears or afﬁrms 
allegiance to the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Constitution with the following words: ‘I solemnly 
swear (afﬁrm) to the peoples of the Kingdom that I shall con-
stantly preserve and uphold the Charter of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands and the Constitution. I swear (afﬁrm) that 
I shall defend and preserve the independence and the ter-
ritory of the Kingdom to the best of my ability, that I shall 
protect the freedoms and rights of all Dutch nationals and 
all persons living in the Netherlands, and that I shall employ 
all means placed at my disposal by the law to support and 
promote the welfare of all, as is incumbent upon a good and 
faithful King. So help me God! (This I afﬁrm and promise).’
Ineffectuality
The Constitution determines the procedure in situations 
where the monarch is unable to exercise royal authority. 
These procedures come into effect in three cases. The ﬁrst 
case is when the monarch has not yet reached the age of 
majority (18) (Article 33). The second is when the monarch is 
deemed unﬁt to rule (Article 35). If the Council of Ministers 
decides that the monarch is incapable of exercising his royal 
authority, it reports its ﬁndings to the States-General, hav-
ing ﬁrst sought the advice of the Council of State. The States-
General assembles in plenary session and if they share the 
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judgement of the Council of Ministers the monarch is 
declared unﬁt to rule. The declaration is made by the Presi-
dent of the plenary session of the States-General and takes 
effect immediately. The law does not need to be invoked 
to make the declaration, but it does need to be invoked to 
reverse it. The monarch may then take up where he left off 
and again exercise his royal authority. Long-term absence 
or physical or mental illness can result in such a declaration. 
There have been two instances since 1814: when William iii 
took ill in 1889 and 1890. 
The third case is addressed in Article 36. The monarch is 
able to temporarily relinquish his royal authority and to 
re-assert it by virtue of a law that he himself instigates. The 
decision is taken by the States-General in plenary session. 
The state of health of Queen Wilhelmina led to these pow-
ers being invoked under an Act passed on 10 October 1947. 
As the duration of the relinquishment had not been deter-
mined beforehand, there were no procedures to re-instate 
them. Article 36 of the Constitution determines how this is 
to be regulated by law.
The question arose whether the monarch’s decision to 
temporarily relinquish his royal authority (or to abdicate) 
is taken outside ministerial responsibility, regardless of 
the countersigning. Article 36 may be interpreted in a way 
which suggests that an Act of Parliament would be needed 
to re-assert royal authority but not to relinquish it. However, 
given the import of these decisions, a legal foundation is 
desirable. The time of relinquishment and re-assertion can 
be determined in a royal decree, which evolves under min-
isterial responsibility. As the monarch does not have royal 
authority, the royal decree to re-instate it must be signed by 
the regent.3
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Article 37 of the Constitution sets out the conditions for the 
re-assertion of royal authority. The regent deputizes for the 
monarch in the following ﬁve cases for as long as:
1 the monarch has not yet reached the age of eighteen years;
2 an unborn child can accede to the throne;
3 the monarch is declared unﬁt to rule;
4 the monarch has temporarily relinquished royal 
authority;
5 there is no successor after the death or abdication of the 
monarch.
In cases three and four, the monarch’s child, who is presum-
ably also heir to the throne, legally becomes regent, pro-
vided he has reached the age of eighteen. In the other cases 
a regent is appointed by an Act of Parliament. The States-
General meet in plenary session and take a decision. Article 
38 states that in the absence of a monarch or regent, royal 
authority shall be exercised by the Council of State. The aim 
of the article is to provide a safety net but it creates a prob-
lem at the same time because the Constitution does not say 
who is to decide, under such circumstances, that the Coun-
cil of State is to act. It may be assumed that the task falls to 
the Council of Ministers (the government cannot take this 
decision because the monarch is part of the government) in 
consultation with the Chambers of the States-General.
The Royal House
Interestingly, the Constitution mentions the members of 
the Royal House despite the fact that they have no ofﬁcial 
powers or obligations, apart from the specially regulated 
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powers in Section 2 of the Council of State Act (Wet op de 
Raad van State). Article 39 of the Constitution: ‘Membership 
of the Royal House shall be regulated by Act of Parliament’ 
was added so that the subsequent ministerial responsibil-
ity for members of the Royal House could be more sharply 
deﬁned. The members of the monarch’s family who qualify 
as members of the Royal House as regulated in the Member-
ship of the Royal House Act of 2002 are the monarch (also 
an abdicated monarch), those who can succeed the mon-
arch under the Constitution and are blood relatives no fur-
ther than the second degree, the heir presumptive and the 
spouses of the aforesaid. There is no formal difference in the 
responsibilities of members of the Royal House – except in 
the case of the monarch himself – and other members of the 
Royal Family, though the crown prince is, of course, closer 
to the throne.
 Under the Constitution and the Royal House Finances 
Act, the State pays allowances directly to Queen Beatrix, 
Prince Willem-Alexander and Princess Máxima. The other 
members of the Royal House do not receive allowances. The 
allowances consist of three components: Component A, 
which relates to staff costs; Component B, which relates to 
other expenses; Component C, which is the income compo-
nent. The following table shows the estimated allowances 
for 2008 (in thousands of euros):
r e c i p i e n t a b c total
The Queen 1,590 1,819 792 4,201
Prince Willem 310 463 235 1008
Alexander
Princess Máxima 310 348 235 893
Source: www.koninklijkhuis.nl
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When ministerial responsibility was introduced in the Con-
stitution of 1848 the relationship between king and minis-
ters changed. All powers nominally vested in the king would 
be exercised by ‘the king acting under ministerial respon-
sibility’. Apart from hereditary succession and ﬁnancial 
status the system no longer allowed personal rights of the 
king. King and the ministers together form the government 
(Art. 42 of the Dutch Constitution). The political inviolabil-
ity of the king means that his personal views have to be kept 
outside the political debate. The king’s personal opinion on 
government policies must remain conﬁdential. Therefore 
the weekly consultations with the prime minister are impor-
tant to present one face to the outside world. There is also 
an unwritten rule that ‘derived’ ministerial responsibility 
applies in respect of discharge of representative duties and 
other acts touching upon the public interest. This makes it 
impossible for members of the Royal House to run for pub-
lic ofﬁce. The annual payments received by the king and a 
number of members of the Royal House are regulated in the 
Royal House Finances Act. To a considerable extent the per-
sons falling under this Act are exempt from taxation (Art. 40 
of the Dutch Constitution). 
In February 2009 former Minister of Finance Gerrit Zalm 
presented a report which states that the Dutch monarchy 
costs 39 million euros a year.4 The Royal House contributes 
to the proper functioning of the state and is one of the most 
important elements in the public relations of the Nether-
lands. The personal inviolability of the king implies that 
the king is immune to criminal prosecution. On the under-
standing that they will always be conducted in the name of a 
representative, civil proceedings are not precluded. Because 
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the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a democratic state under 
the rule of law, the government understands that the queen 
has to accept criticism. In 2003 two citizens had to pay a ﬁne 
of 250 euros, one for insulting Prince Willem-Alexander 
and Máxima and the other for throwing paint at the Golden 
Carriage on the day of their marriage. It rarely happens in 
the Netherlands, but on 30 July 2007 the Amsterdam court 
sentenced Regilio A. to pay a ﬁne of 400 euros because he 
had insulted a police ofﬁcer and the queen. He also stayed 
one week in jail. According to criminal law since 1881 the 
maximum penalty for offending the king is ﬁve years in jail. 
From the perspective of freedom of speech this is too long 
if one compares it with the maximum of two years in jail 
in normal cases concerning the rules of offending between 
citizens.
19
3
Monarchical design 
and powers
The Constitution of 1983 attributes scarcely any powers 
to the government. But in Dutch Law the government is 
regarded as the ‘engine behind the system’. This role has 
been strengthened by the development of the welfare state 
and ever-increasing internationalization and Europeaniza-
tion. The government is a composite body made up of the 
monarch and one or more ministers. Both are entrusted with 
powers of government. Some powers belong to the monarch 
alone and some to the ministers alone. The powers of the 
monarch are those which accrue to a head of state. The pow-
ers wielded by the ministers, such as the right to head a min-
istry or to countersign documents, are granted by law. 
The Constitution does not actually use the term ‘head of 
state’, but Article 2(3) of the Statute does refer to the ‘head 
of the Kingdom’. As head of state, the monarch acts as the 
representative of the Netherlands in external relations. The 
head of state also plays a key role in cabinet formation by 
appointing an informateur and a formateur. The monarch 
abdicates in his capacity as head of state, though abdication 
by royal decree is preferred.
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As part of the government, the monarch shares the powers 
that accrue to the government, but the extent of those pow-
ers remains behind closed doors. The monarch meets the 
prime-minister once a week. However, there must always be 
a minister who is accountable for the actions and decisions 
of the monarch regardless of whether or not the monarch 
plays an active role in government.
It is precisely because the formation of a cabinet in the Neth-
erlands is so closely related to the government that the role 
played by the monarch in this process should not be dis-
missed when the position of the monarchy in constitutional 
law is under review. After all, the monarch plays a key role 
in the formation of a cabinet. Indeed, up to the moment that 
the formateur (in most cases) takes ofﬁce as prime minis-
ter and places his signature under the appointments of the 
other ministers, the monarch, who is guided by a succes-
sion of advisors, is the only empowered organ in the cabinet 
formation. The Constitution does refer to the appointment 
and dismissal of ministers and says that ministers who 
have relinquished ofﬁce are allowed to retain their seat in 
the Chamber.5 However, it is totally silent on the subject of 
cabinet formation. Effectively, the process of cabinet forma-
tion is part of the unwritten constitutional law of the Neth-
erlands, rooted in national history and evolving with years 
of practice. In the nineteenth century cabinets were even 
formed out of the public eye and without parliamentary 
involvement. There was no connection with the doctrine 
of ministerial responsibility. The power of the monarch 
only started to diminish as the power of the Second Cham-
ber grew and political parties gathered strength. Still, the 
monarch remains the spider in the web of cabinet forma-
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tion right up to the present day: the monarch may appoint 
informateurs and formateurs as he or she sees ﬁt, without any 
formal approval. This state of affairs is explained away by 
the need for ‘continuity’ of government. The monarch’s role 
is limited to process and progress.6 It would be difﬁcult for 
the monarch to make ‘sovereign’ decisions. Moreover, the 
(in)formateur is ‘entirely dependent’ on the parliamentary 
parties or their chairpersons.7 But Queen Beatrix has for-
mal tasks, like the cabinet formation, the Address from the 
Throne and she co-signs new Acts of Parliament. She plays 
a cohesive, representative and encouraging role for the peo-
ple of the Netherlands, contributing to social stability, con-
tinuity and progress. The monarch represents the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands at home and abroad and attends ofﬁcial 
events. The real problem seems to be that cabinet formation 
in the Netherlands still conveys an impression of personal 
power exercised at the expense of public power. Cabinet for-
mation is seen as the blind spot on the landscape of Consti-
tutional law in the Netherlands. 
The Dutch Constitution accords a central role to the mon-
arch. It is patently monarchical in design with no clear 
explication of the legitimacy of government authority.8 
Chapter 1 deals with constitutional rights. Chapter 2, which 
deals with the government, is split into two parts: the ﬁrst 
devoted to the monarch and the second to the monarch 
and the ministers. Hence the government – not Parliament 
– comes ﬁrst in the Constitution – and the monarch comes 
ﬁrst in the government. This is because the Constitution of 
1815 was based on the personal rule of the monarch, a legacy 
that also left its stamp on the Constitution of 1983. Hence, 
the ministers served the king and had to win his cooperation 
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to pass laws. It was not until revolution was sweeping across 
Europe that the principle of political ministerial responsi-
bility was formally introduced in the Netherlands. The pow-
ers of Parliament were extended, and as a counterpart the 
Crown was given the right to dissolve the Chambers. It still 
took another twenty years (1868) for the king and his min-
isters to bow to Parliament. Since 1868 a Chamber may be 
dissolved only once as a result of a conﬁdence crisis.        
 In keeping with Thorbecke’s dualist system, the par-
liaments which have been elected by popular vote since 
1866-1868 have been regarded as the basis of governance in 
the Netherlands. However, it is the government – or more 
speciﬁcally the cabinet – which is the engine. For example, 
the cabinet is assumed to enjoy the conﬁdence of Parlia-
ment unless proven otherwise. This unwritten rule implies 
a sort of top-down approach, even though it does reason-
ably chime with the primacy of the power of the executive 
in a complex welfare state, so strongly inﬂuenced by legisla-
tion from international organizations and the effects of the 
global economy, that Dutch parliament in many important 
issues stays behind. 
Though the Dutch Constitution does not exactly say that 
the monarch is head of state, this role is generally seen as 
an attribute of kingship. According to Douwe Jan Elzinga, 
the job description of the Dutch head of state is not in con-
formity with the requirements of the constitutional neuter, 
especially the role that the Queen plays on the day of the 
Queen’s speech (Prinsjesdag). Article 65 of the Constitution 
states the following: ‘A statement of the policy to be pursued 
by the government shall be given by or on behalf of the King 
before a joint session of the two Houses of the States General 
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that shall be held every year on the third Tuesday in Septem-
ber or on such earlier date as may be prescribed by Act of 
Parliament.’ When the Queen reads out this Address from 
the Throne at the start of the parliamentary year, it gives 
the impression that the head of state is materially involved 
in political and party political dimensions of government 
policy. It is questionable whether the reading out of policy 
plans of a cabinet by the Queen is in line with the politically-
neutral role of the head of state. Elzinga suggests that the 
Address from the Throne should be split into two parts: after 
the opening words and the general speech by the Queen, the 
Prime-Minister presents the policy plans of the cabinet. 
El zinga also underlines that the chairmanship of the Coun-
cil of State for the Queen is not in conformity with the role 
that the head of state has as part of the constitutional neu-
ter.9 This is problematic for the Dutch monarchy if the pres-
ence of a neuter is seen as a crucial part of the representative 
democracy and if this constitutional neuter plays a role in 
the elimination of the discrepancy between monarchy and 
democracy. 
Article 2 of the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (an 
agreement between the Netherlands, the Netherlands Anti-
lles and Aruba, originally stemming from 1954) and Article 
42(1) of the Constitution imply the choice of a structure in 
which the monarch forms part of the government. Needless 
to say, there are other options, such as the monarch as head 
of state but not a member of the government. In this case, 
the Charter as well as the Constitution would need to be 
revised.10 The odds of this happening are fairly low. When 
the monarch accedes to the throne, he or she undertakes to 
uphold the dignity of the Crown. Queen Beatrix echoed this 
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precept when accepting an honorary doctorate from Leiden 
University on 8 February 2005:11 
‘As a symbol of the continuity and link between the past and 
the future, he too, like all public ofﬁce bearers, is respon-
sible for passing on the ofﬁce with its dignity intact to the 
next generation.’ 
Though the government consists ofﬁcially of the monarch 
and the ministers, the Crown can consist of the monarch 
and only one minister or state secretary (junior minister). 
When the monarch reigns, he or she does so under ministe-
rial responsibility, as the monarch is inviolate. In the Dutch 
system there are no ‘personal rights of the king’, apart from 
hereditary succession, his ﬁnancial status and inviolability 
itself.12 The term ‘king’ is applied with various meanings 
in the Dutch Constitution, appearing in relation to lineage 
aspects such as succession and regency, but also in relation 
to decisions by the government, including appointment by 
royal decree as understood by Article 42 of the Constitution, 
which states that the government is formed by the king and 
ministers. The term ‘King’ (or ‘Queen’) also appears in legis-
lation, though what it really means is the government. 
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Current legitimization of the monarchy: 
the bond between the Netherlands 
and the House of Orange
The use of the colour orange on ceremonial occasions 
when ‘nationhood’ is invoked is a reﬂection of the family 
name Oranje-Nassau. The royal family in the Netherlands 
are indirect descendents of Prince William of Orange (1533-
1584), also named William the Silent, who can be seen as 
the founder of the Dutch state. On two days in the year the 
monarchy in the Netherlands is very visible. Koninginnedag 
or Queen’s Day is the celebration of the queen’s birthday on 
the 30th of April, not a private family affair anymore, but 
a national holiday full of festivities, also the day of ‘ribbon 
rain’ on which the monarch honours citizens with medals. 
The second important annual ceremonial reminder of the 
function of the monarchy is Prinjesdag. On the third Tues-
day in September the queen rides to the parliament build-
ings for the opening ceremony attended by the members 
of the States General. The queen delivers the Address from 
the Throne, written together with the governing cabinet. 
Koninginnedag and Prinsjesdag get a lot of attention from the 
media. Because of the traditional role of the Orange family 
the Dutch monarchy is ﬁrmly established, although Article 
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30 of the Dutch Constitution is not an obligation to main-
tain the monarchy. ‘The Dutch people are not monarchists at 
heart (as for instance the British) but republicans. It is only 
the high regard for the House of Oranje-Nassau and its role 
in Dutch history that perpetuates the monarchy. There can 
be little doubt that if the family were to die out, a republi-
can form of government would be proclaimed immediately’, 
states William Shetter.13 
The monarchy has enjoyed the approval of large swathes 
of the Dutch population over many years. Even when the 
Dutch state was a confederated republic, it was often (mili-
tarily) led by stadholders from the House of Orange-Nassau. 
For centuries, the historic bond with the House of Orange 
has been taken as read and customarily associated with the 
eighty years struggle waged by stadholder Prince William 
of Orange for freedom, tolerance and independence from 
Spain in the sixteenth-century. Originally William came 
from Nassau (in Germany), but in 1544 he acquired the title 
Prince of Orange (in France). The tradition around freedom 
ﬁghter William the Silent is a strong tradition, unique in 
European history, which resonates throughout the ‘Wilhel-
mus van Nassouwe’, the ofﬁcial Dutch national anthem.14 
In 1932 the Cabinet decided that it should be played on all 
ofﬁcial occasions, but earlier it had been played or sung on 
occasions such as the investiture of Queen Wilhelmina in 
1898. ‘Wilhelmus van Nassouwe’ itself is very old and prob-
ably written by Philip Marnix of St. Aldegonde (1540-1598) 
around 1568 and dedicated to William the Silent, the prince 
of German blood. Between 1815 and 1932 the Dutch national 
anthem was ‘Wiens Neerlands Bloed’ (Whose Dutch blood) 
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with, especially from a European perspective, horrible lyr-
ics. The national anthem ‘Wilhelmus van Nassouwe’ is not 
just an attestation of national loyalty, it is a prayer as well: 
‘My shield and reliance, art thou O God my Lord’. 
Although the bond between the Netherlands and the House 
of Orange is old, the Netherlands has been a constitutional 
monarchy only since 1815, when William I became the ﬁrst 
king of the constitutional monarchy, orchestrated from 
London.15 But one can defend that the idea and practice of 
having a monarchy was introduced by the French, when 
Napoleon installed his brother Louis Bonaparte as king in 
the ‘Kingdom of Holland’. The establishment of a unitary 
state survived the French period. 
 One important development is that the socialists have 
come to accept the Dutch royal house. This is largely the 
result of the strong personality and actions of Queen Wil-
helmina, Mother of the Resistance, during World War ii.16 
After her quick withdrawal to London in 1940, Queen Wil-
helmina played an important role by supporting the Dutch 
people under the occupation by the Nazis and inspired the 
resistance movement. With the exception of King William 
ii and King William iii, who both died in ofﬁce, abdication 
from the throne seems to be a recent de facto tradition in the 
monarchy of the Netherlands since Queen Wilhelmina and 
Queen Juliana. When the Queen dies or abdicates, her eld-
est son or daughter succeeds to the throne. Queen Beatrix 
has stated that she will not abdicate very soon; she wants to 
allow the Prince of Orange (‘Crown Prince’) Willem-Alex-
ander and his wife Princess Máxima to spend enough time 
with their family.17 
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The majority of Netherlanders seem happy with the idea that 
there is someone who stands above the political parties. The 
head of state and the Royal House symbolize the unity of the 
Dutch nation and the power vacuum (which exists in many 
other countries) at the top is ﬁlled with the ups and downs 
of family life in the form of births, christenings, weddings 
and funerals. Dutch monarchs have been members of the 
Dutch Reformed Church, but this is not constitutionally 
required. Millions of people from all shades of the political 
spectrum followed the marriage of the Prince of Orange to 
Máxima Zorreguieta and the funerals of Prince Claus, Queen 
Juliana and Prince Bernhard. 
The celebration of the Queen’s Birthday (30 April) – not really 
the birthday of Queen Beatrix but that of her mother, Queen 
Juliana – seems to illustrate the separation of ofﬁce and per-
son, but at the same time the ofﬁce remains very personal. 
Street parties are held all over the Netherlands, and Queen 
Beatrix and other members of the Royal House visit festivi-
ties in one or two places each year, with live broadcasting 
on television. Paul Schnabel states: ‘In this connection it is 
also interesting to see how much the colour orange on that 
day, but actually on all occasions on which national identity 
wants to be celebrated, has become the colour of the peo-
ple, clearly differently perceived than the national tricolour, 
which has remained more the ﬂag of the country and of the 
state. There is always a need for kings and queens, princes 
and princesses. They are the archetypes of authority, the 
symbols of national identity, but also the icons of what is 
really important in life: the succession of generations and 
the transfer of values and standards’.18 What the monarchy 
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stands for today is not really about religion, the unity of the 
nation, the fatherland or the kingdom anymore. 
When members of the royal family become socially evolved, 
for instance Prince Claus concerning development coopera-
tion, ‘ambassadors’ for a good cause, Schnabel points out 
that they look like modern representatives of the old noblesse 
oblige, earning noblesse by engaging in unselﬁsh obligations. 
It is in that way that the members of the royal family con-
tribute to the legitimization of the monarchy in the Neth-
erlands, and they get positive rewards, even from the mem-
bers of parliament from the Green Left Party. Dorien Pessers 
states: ‘Politicians are associated with shared interests. The 
king is associated with the common good. The social orien-
tation of the monarchy is also different. It is true that the 
king is at the top of the society, but he is really supposed 
to be concerned about the bottom.’19 It is probably because 
of this social and cultural orientation of the Dutch monar-
chy, an orientation that is also appreciated by more radical 
and left-wing politicians in the Dutch parliament, that the 
opposition to the monarchy in the Netherlands is seen as 
a minority. Of course, the monarchic form of government 
is not undisputed. Queen Juliana gave rise to discussions 
when she was inﬂuenced by a faith healer. Her husband 
Prince Bernhard was involved in a questionable enterprise. 
The views presented by ‘Het Republikeins Genootschap’ (the 
Republican Society), a club with about 150 members, are 
primarily based on a more egalitarian vision of democracy.20 
In 2004 the society did present an alternative for the cur-
rent Dutch Constitution.21 Also active and a little bigger is 
another republican society, the ‘Nieuw Republikeins Genoot-
schap’.22
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Scandals around the monarchy, for instance around the 
escapades of Prince Bernhard von Lippe-Biesterfeld, the 
father of Queen Beatrix, or the marriages of Prince Willem-
Alexander, Princess Margarita and Prince Johan Friso23, led 
to fascinating television and critical articles in the press of 
course, but as long as the Prime Minister takes full respon-
sibility, the Dutch parliament seems to accept the solutions, 
and the scandals do not seem to lead to a strong tendency 
towards the establishment of a republic. When Prince Wil-
lem-Alexander, born in 1967, wanted to marry Máxima Zor-
reguieta, there was a violent debate. It became known that 
her father had been Minister of Agriculture in the dictato-
rial regime under general Videla in Argentina, a military 
junta that ruled Argentina in the 1970s which was respon-
sible for up to 30,000 deaths. But the solution supported 
by socialist politicians such as former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and human rights specialist Max van der Stoel and 
Prime Minister Wim Kok, was broadly accepted, with Máxi-
ma’s father agreeing not to be present at their wedding on 2 
February 2002. In fact the scandals led to more appreciation 
for the professionalism and the constitutional carefulness 
of Queen Beatrix.24 In December 2007, during her annual 
Christmas speech, Queen Beatrix urged Dutch citizens 
to be more tolerant. She stated that the Dutch democratic 
tradition comprises more than only the acceptance of the 
power of the majority; it is also about respect for minori-
ties. Geert Wilders, the leader of the anti-Europe and anti-
immigration Party for Freedom (pvv), called for reducing 
the monarchy to a purely ceremonial role. Wilders said that 
he was offended by the Queen’s speech, which he described 
as ‘stuffed full of multi-cultural nonsense’ largely directed 
at his party.25 According to a recent poll (29 April 2008) by 
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Maurice de Hond, the majority of the people in the Nether-
lands are quite content with the monarchy.26 In answer to 
the question – should the Netherlands become a republic, or 
should the Netherlands remain a monarchy? – 70 per cent 
of respondents think the Netherlands should remain a mon-
archy, while 25 per cent would prefer to establish a republic. 
The increase of 5% over the last two years could be related 
to the popularity of Geert Wilders, who wants Queen Bea-
trix out of government. Wilders won 9 seats (out of 150) in 
the elections for the Second Chamber on 22 November 2006, 
but his nationalistic, conservative, anti-Europe and anti-
Islam party pvv is growing strongly in the polls. During the 
general elections of the 9the of June 2010 the pvv added 15 
seats and now are the third party in the Netherlands with 24 
seats in the Lower House, three more than the 21 seats of the 
Christian Democrats. 
Source: Maurice de Hond  Methodology: Interviews with 1,000 Dutch adults, conducted on Apr. 29, 2008. No 
margin of error was provided. 
 2008 2007 2006
The Netherlands should  70% 71% 76%
remain a monarchy
The Netherlands should 25% 23% 20%
become a republic
Not sure / No answer 5% 6% 4%
The failed attack on the royal bus in Apeldoorn on Queen’s 
Day 2009 sent shock waves through the Netherlands. Queen’s 
Day is a special occasion with plenty of opportunities for 
contact between Queen Beatrix and the general public. The 
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perpetrator Karst T. mortally wounded seven people when he 
drove his car at high speed through the crowds. No-one had 
expected anything like this. The car collided to a halt when 
it hit the fence around a monument shortly after the bus 
carrying the Royal Family had passed. Although the mem-
bers of the Royal Family were the target, it was not entirely 
clear whether Karst T. intended to kill them. When a police-
man asked him for his reasons, he said: ‘Willem-Alexander 
is a fascist, he is a racist and I knew that the queen would 
come here’ (NRC Handelsblad, 4 September 2009). Karst T. 
died of his injuries in the night following the attack. A judi-
cial inquiry concluded that it was unlikely that Karst T. had 
committed the act out of a speciﬁc ideology or conviction. 
In 2004 he had, however, conﬁded to a former employer that 
he ‘wanted to be famous’ and had jokingly mentioned that 
he was considering launching an attack on the Royal House. 
Friends and family of Karst T. had previously expressed fears 
that he would take his own life.
Many people – above all the members of the Royal Family – 
were deeply shocked by the attack. Queen Beatrix made a tel-
evision appearance on the same day to express her sympathy 
for the loved ones of the dead and wounded. Her sincere and 
deeply human concern made a profound impression. Every-
one knew that members of the Royal Family could have been 
killed in the attack – which strengthened the bond between 
the people and the Oranjes. Indeed, Queen Beatrix received 
a digniﬁed applause from the crowds that had gathered on 
Dam Square, Amsterdam, for the Remembrance Ceremony 
a few days later on 4 May 2009. The members of the Royal 
Family said they wanted to continue as usual. No ofﬁcial 
duties were struck off the agenda. But the attack did raise 
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questions about the relationship between the open char-
acter of Queen’s Day and the security arrangements. It also 
raised questions as to whether it was prudent to transport 
the Royal Family on one bus.
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Sovereign power
One of the complicated problems with the tension between 
monarchy and democracy has to do with the word sover-
eignty. Sovereign power has a bad reputation and is often 
confused with absolutism. But the theory of sovereignty, 
originally developed in the thirteenth century in France and 
England, is not linked to the absolutist period. It appears 
among the statists (Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes), the theo-
logians (Luther, Calvin, Suárez, Mariana) and the liberals 
(Locke), and its deﬁnitions and implications differ with 
every author. It is important to understand that sovereign 
power was deﬁned by contrasting it with feudalism and 
despotism. Feudal power is always acquired ‘at the end of a 
sword, a shield, and a standard’, said the Huguenot Philippe 
du Plessis Mornay.27 Feudalism governs its subjects as the 
father of a family does his slaves. For Montesquieu despot-
ism does not constitute an addition to the Aristotelian triad 
of good political regimes (monarchy, aristocracy, republic), 
nor does it reproduce in a new category the pathology dis-
persed among the degenerate political forms (tyranny, oli-
garchy, democracy). For Montesquieu despotism was a type 
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of government essentially ‘foreign’, it was the ‘other’ state, 
distant from Europe in a geographical sense, socially cut 
off from Western civilization, ﬁnding the roots of despot-
ism in countries like Persia, Turkey and China. With Mon-
tesquieu one can seriously contend that the idea of despot-
ism conﬂicts with the European civilization, but not the 
idea of monarchy. 
It is even possible to start the concept of a single Europe 
with the Roman Empire or with Charlemagne’s ‘Holy Roman 
Empire’. And was it not King Henry iv of France who pre-
sented the idea of the ‘Christian Commonwealth of Europe’ 
in the beginning of the seventeenth century, not to mention 
the European aspirations of Emperor Napoleon? Consider-
ing more recent history it is well known that Queen Beatrix 
strongly supported the process of European integration, in 
her eyes based on the need to avoid war, especially after the 
experiences of the Dutch nation during World War ii, and 
probably also based on her personal experience, with a Ger-
man father and a German husband. For her and many of her 
generation it was vital to bring Germany within the Euro-
pean partnership. In that light the placing of French and 
German coal and steel production under a ‘High Author-
ity’ in 1951, with power to make legally binding decisions, 
seemed more than logical. The European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty introduced the idea of ‘community’ with 
distinct legal personality, represented by autonomous insti-
tutions and Member States that ceded ‘national sovereignty’ 
to institutions for deﬁned purposes. After the loss of the 
Dutch East Indies (since 1949 Indonesia) the Dutch proﬁted 
enormously from the open economy and the ‘common mar-
ket’ with the ‘four freedoms’ in Europe. The wider agenda 
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of an integrated European Union is not seen as conﬂicting 
with the Dutch monarchy as long as the process of European 
integration is good for the Dutch economy and respects the 
national identity and constitutional tradition of the Neth-
erlands (Article 4 teu), although it is known that Queen 
Juliana did see the euro-sceptic United Kingdom becoming 
a Member State of the European Communities in 1973 as one 
of the most important successes of the foreign policy of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands after World War ii!28 
Parliament and government, including Queen Beatrix, are 
fully aware that the survival of the Dutch economy in the 
global economy depends very much on an effective Euro-
pean Union and the harmonious development of economic 
activities. The European treaties are automatically incorpo-
rated into the Dutch legal system at the point of ratiﬁcation. 
The Dutch do not seem to have any trouble with the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities deﬁning the char-
acter of the supranational legal order in a pragmatic way, or 
with the strengthening of rights and interests of nationals 
through introduction of European citizenship, but a draft 
eu Constitution was rejected in referenda in France and the 
Netherlands in 2005, mainly because of the fear for a Euro-
pean ‘superstate’ and an increase in the democratic deﬁcit. 
Most Dutch want to see the European Union primarily as a 
union of states.29 More founded in treaty relationships and 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda of Article 4 (3) teu, than 
in a written eu Constitution. Although the task of the Euro-
pean Union is the creation of the common market, meaning 
the elimination of all obstacles to intra-Community trade in 
order to merge the national market into a single market, the 
new eu Treaty, after the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 
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1 December 2009, mentions secession and mechanisms for 
withdrawal in Article 50 teu, which shows some explicit 
respect for the sovereignty of the Member States.
If we deﬁne sovereignty, it has to be stressed that the sover-
eign is not the same as sovereignty. Sovereignty is the princi-
ple of certain autonomy with respect to foreign powers, sov-
ereignty is the public authority for international cohesion, 
and sovereignty is always limited by divine, natural and fun-
damental law. If there were no limits, sovereignty would not 
be different from feudal dominion.30 Montesquieu even pre-
sented despotism, government without law and limits, as 
destructive of the ruler’s own interests: ‘As people who live 
under a good government are happier than those who, with-
out rule or leaders, wander about the forests; so monarchs 
who live under the fundamental laws of their country, are 
happier than despotic princes, who have nothing to regu-
late either their own or their subjects’ hearts’.31 In the con-
stitutional tradition of the Netherlands there is the speciﬁc 
pact that the monarch is a servant of the people, that he will 
not act as a tyrant and will look after the interest of the peo-
ple. If not, the people are entitled to armed resistance.32 It 
was this Calvinistic theory that helped Willem of Orange to 
break away from the King of Spain (see the Declaration of 
Independence of 1581, with arguments inspired by Du Ples-
sis Mornay). 
One might wonder whether, despite the long-standing 
bond between the Netherlands and the House of Orange, 
the evolving democracy might be creating too much ten-
sion around the monarchy. Given the doctrine of popu-
lar sovereignty, based on universal equality, it is certainly 
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extraordinary that accession to the throne is determined 
by the bloodline. In the fore-mentioned speech at Leiden 
University on 8 February 2005, Queen Beatrix said: ‘I did 
not choose the throne – but I have accepted it. An ofﬁce 
that comes to one through birth is, by deﬁnition, not an 
ofﬁce that is earned by personal merit. It calls, above all, for 
humility… self-reﬂection…’. Lack of authority in the execu-
tion of a hereditary ofﬁce is acceptable only if the ofﬁce-
holder is ‘virtually silenced’.33 In a parliamentary democracy 
this is organized by means of inviolability and ministerial 
responsibility (Article 42(2) of the Constitution). Inviolabil-
ity is acceptable because the monarch has, in principle, no 
autonomous constitutional powers, apart from the power to 
organize his or her own House with due regard to the public 
interest (Article 41 of the Constitution). The monarch stands 
outside the parliamentary debate; ministers may not defend 
their policies by quoting the monarch’s ideas. As the invio-
lability principle prevents the monarch from being called to 
account, the ministers bear full responsibility for his or her 
actions. Thus, government policy has full rein inside and 
outside Parliament. Ministerial responsibility comes into 
play in, for example, the counter-signing of a royal decree. 
Also, if the head of state or a member of the royal house 
makes a statement or acts in a speciﬁc way, the ministers 
are responsible. Parliament can call the prime minister to 
account under the terms of ministerial responsibility, even 
in private matters – provided they affect the public interest. 
In principle, the monarch and the prime minister meet 
once a week to maintain consistency of government. In the 
event of a conﬂict the minister or the cabinet must resign, or 
the monarch can be declared incapable of exercising royal 
authority. Both situations could potentially endanger the 
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monarchy; hence, for the sake of the dynasty, the monarch 
must accede to the will of the cabinet backed by Parliament. 
Even so, the monarch can still exert a substantive inﬂuence: 
‘As a member of the government, the Queen can exert a 
strong inﬂuence on policy, but this goes unnoticed by the 
public,’ says Van Wijnen, who illustrates at the same time 
the fragility of the concept of the unity of the Crown and the 
‘secret of Noordeinde’ (royal discretion).34
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Cabinet formation: the start 
of the procedure 
When a cabinet has tendered its resignation and assumed 
caretaker status, the monarch accepts the resignation for 
consideration and asks the ministers to continue to per-
form the tasks which they deem to be in the national inter-
est. Article 42(1) of the Constitution states that the govern-
ment consists of the monarch and ministers; accountable 
ministers must therefore always remain in ofﬁce. A care-
taker cabinet may not, in theory, take any major decisions 
which could undermine the negotiations between the 
political parties, but it must fulﬁl duties which are in the 
national interest, such as important business that cannot be 
postponed. Then the procedure for forming a new cabinet 
begins. The monarch requests advice from various politi-
cians: the Chair of the First and Second Chambers (Senate 
and the House of Representatives), the Vice-President of the 
Council of State,35 the party leaders from the Second Cham-
ber and sometimes ministers of state. These encounters 
may be regarded as evidence of royal action. The public can 
consult the media to ﬁnd out whether certain customs and 
principles are observed. Failure on the part of the monarch 
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to respect the principles can be attributed to the caretaker 
ministers and to the new ministers once the cabinet has 
been formed. When the new ministers accept ofﬁce, they 
effectively afﬁrm that the monarch has adhered to the prin-
ciples of cabinet formation. 
During their meetings with the monarch the Vice-President 
of the Council of State, the politicians and others offer writ-
ten and oral recommendations on the composition of the 
new cabinet and the appointment of an informateur or a for-
mateur. It is then the task of the impartial monarch to select 
an informateur to explore the various alternatives for a cabi-
net, or a formateur to actually form a cabinet. In principle, 
the formateur is the prospective prime minister and, accord-
ing to the doctrine, also the best person for reporting later 
to the States-General on how the cabinet was formed. The 
monarch is expected to be guided by the election results and 
the advice and not by personal preference. The monarch is 
impartial and therefore treats all party leaders in the same 
way. He or she is expected to insist on clear advice and, when 
in doubt, will follow the recommendations of the ministers 
of state. The public must be made to feel that the monarch 
has virtually no powers of decision.36 The ofﬁcial line is that, 
in a cabinet formation, the monarch acts ‘within the limits 
of the proffered recommendations’.37 
The monarch is expected to use this advice to steer events 
rationally towards the formation of a cabinet capable of a 
productive relationship with the States-General. The names 
of the informateur and formateur are announced in a bulle-
tin from the Queen’s Ofﬁce and published in the Govern-
ment Gazette (Staatscourant). So there is no question of a 
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royal decree – which would, in any case, have to be coun-
tersigned by the caretaker cabinet. These appointments are 
seen merely as preliminary to the eventual appointment of 
the ministers of the new cabinet. Hence, the informateur is 
not appointed by the Second Chamber but by the monarch. 
The informateur should be seen as the procedural assistant 
of the monarch, preventing him or her from getting caught 
up in the political to-ing and fro-ing. When the monarch 
appoints an informateur, he or she follows as far as possible 
the advice of the party chairpersons, or the largest common 
divider from the Second Chamber recommendations or the 
least common multiple thereof. 
The Second Chamber cannot change the informateur once 
the appointment has been accepted. The candidate is free to 
refuse the job. In 1972 Queen Juliana wanted to appoint her 
special equerry Professor W.F. de Gaay Fortman as informa-
teur, allowing him such a wide remit that he could explore 
all the options. But De Gaay Fortman broke with tradition 
and declined to act as an extension of the queen. Rumour 
had it that he did so because he wished to avoid a confron-
tation with his son Bas, leader of the ppr party, which had 
increased its number of seats from two to seven. It is also 
plausible that W.F. de Gaay Fortman had his sights on a min-
isterial appointment. Indeed, this is exactly what happened 
in 1973, when he was offered the post of Minister of Home 
Affairs in the Cabinet of Joop Den Uyl (PvdA).38
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The path to a coalition 
agreement
Whereas an informateur can formally accept a request to rec-
onnoitre the possibilities of forming a coalition, a formateur 
will not ofﬁcially accept the request to form a government 
until he is sure that an agreement has been reached. If no 
agreement is reached the formateur will not – ofﬁcially at 
least – suffer public humiliation. The remit from the mon-
arch may vary but, basically, it makes no difference whether 
the informateur is instructed to look into the possibilities 
of ‘the broadest possible coalition’ or just ‘a coalition’ as, 
in the latter case, the viability of a minority cabinet will 
obviously be explored as well. If the informateur proposes a 
cabinet which cannot count on parliamentary support – as 
instructed by the monarch – the monarch will not accept his 
ﬁndings. One might defend the system by arguing that the 
monarch, who must uphold the Constitution, has the power 
to reject any proposals from the formateur for ministerial 
candidates who, say, have shown little respect for the prin-
ciples of democratic government and the Constitution.39 
In an interview for nos television on 28 April 2005, Ruud 
Lubbers, prime minister from 1982 till 1994, said that Queen 
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Beatrix attempted to exert some inﬂuence on the choice of 
ministers. According to Lubbers, a seasoned veteran of ﬁve 
cabinet formations, the role of the monarch in this proc-
ess should not be underestimated. The queen made known 
her ministerial preferences. Lubbers said that ‘there is, of 
course, “some gentle steering” in the choice of ministers et 
cetera.’40
As the informateur’s mandate comes from an inviolate source, 
he is, in theory, personally responsible for his appointment. 
The informateur’s accountability towards Parliament is 
poorly deﬁned: he cannot be called to account by the Second 
Chamber. How the mandate is explained – especially to the 
media – is solely a matter for the informateur, who has con-
sistently consulted the inviolate head of state on the mat-
ter. Ever since the Jurgens/Mateman motion, tabled on 22 
December 1993, informateurs have been expected to appear 
promptly in the Chamber to report on their activities, but 
there is no question of an obligation.41 Parliament cannot 
impose sanctions.42 In 1994, the reports by Van Aardenne, 
Vis and De Vries during the formation of the ‘Purple’ Cabi-
net sparked a debate between the leaders of vvd, D66 and 
PvdA, particularly Bolkestein (vvd) and Kok (PvdA). Such a 
debate at the end of the (in)formative phase is an important 
point on the scorecard.43 It is a pity that the mandates issued 
by the monarch make no reference to what is, in effect, the 
start of parliamentary accountability for informateurs. For 
example, the monarch could refer to the desirability of pro-
viding Parliament with information.
The cabinet formation consists of a reconnaissance phase, a 
negotiation phase, a coalition agreement, a seat allocation, 
45
the nomination of ministers and state secretaries, and a ﬁnal 
report. The main roles in the negotiation phase are played by 
the leaders of the parties in the Second Chamber. The infor-
mateur has regular meetings with the monarch. The aim is to 
thrash out the main lines of policy in a coalition agreement, 
a sort of deal between a few parliamentary parties and the 
basis for forming a cabinet and deﬁning a programme for 
the next four years. A coalition agreement with too much 
detail will undermine the dualism between the government 
and Parliament. In the ﬁnal report to the monarch the infor-
mateur or formateur states whether a cabinet can be formed. 
Before the formateur submits the ﬁnal report the constituent 
meeting of the (junior) ministerial candidates takes place so 
that prospective ofﬁce bearers can get acquainted, sort out 
any remaining issues and establish the main lines of govern-
ment policy. 
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Insufﬁcient accountability 
towards Parliament
After the negotiations, the monarch is constitutionally 
obliged to appoint a cabinet that reﬂects the will of the 
majority of the Second Chamber. It is not only the appoint-
ment and dismissal of ministers and junior ministers but 
also the organization of departments and the tasks of minis-
ters which are established by royal decree (Articles 43 and 44 
of the Constitution). Article 47 of the Constitution demands 
that laws and royal decrees be signed by both the monarch 
and the minister(s). Article 48 of the Constitution lays down 
the principle of a counter-signature for the appointment 
and dismissal of government ofﬁcials, whereby certain con-
stitutional events coincide. The prime minister is appointed 
by royal decree, which he himself has to counter-sign and 
which, at the same time, concerns the dismissal of his pred-
ecessor. Only at this point does the prime minister share the 
power of the monarch in the formation of the cabinet. He 
then counter-signs the royal decrees appointing other min-
isters. After all, he is, as the new prime minister, the person 
accountable for the new cabinet. Van Wijnen argues that, 
with the First and Second Chamber and the caretaker minis-
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ters having been forced into a position of passive interest, it 
is the monarch who holds all the reins: ‘Everything revolves 
around the queen, who both leads the process and ensures 
that no single party grabs power’.44
After being appointed, the ministers take an oath of ofﬁce 
before the monarch. They also pledge allegiance to the Con-
stitution and promise to execute their ofﬁce truly and faith-
fully. Then they assemble on the palace steps for an ofﬁcial 
photo. Within a short space of time the newly appointed 
cabinet presents its policy statement in the Second Chamber. 
The cabinet composition and the programme are debated by 
the elected representatives, and the ministers wait to ﬁnd 
out whether they have won a majority and have therefore 
been accepted by the Chamber.45 The prime minister, hav-
ing countersigned the decrees, is clearly responsible for the 
ministerial appointments. 
 Occasionally, the screening of new ministers lacks proper 
thoroughness. Indeed, Prime-Minister Balkenende was 
blamed for inadequate screening during the Bijlhout con-
troversy. A few hours after the government was formed in 
July 2002, lpf (List Pim Fortuyn) state secretary or junior 
minister Philomena Bijlhout was forced to resign, because 
she had lied about her links with the former military dicta-
torship in Surinam, where she was born. The prime minister 
is accountable for his actions as formateur and for the results 
of the preceding phase, insofar as this phase has formed a 
basis for the cabinet formation. In practice, the prime min-
ister does not seem to be accountable for the methods and 
actions of previous informateurs or formateurs. As the mon-
arch is inviolate and as the caretaker cabinet cannot be held 
responsible for, say, the protracted duration of the recon-
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naissance or formation phase, no-one is no accountable to 
Parliament. The formation resulting in the Van Agt Cabinet 
in 1977 took 208 days. Calling an unsuccessful formateur to 
account is an arduous business. One might apply a system 
in which the party leaders accept accountability towards 
the electorate, but there still remains the inviolate monarch 
who is not covered for derailments, delays, or underper-
forming informateurs, and the caretaker cabinet that does 
not dare to intervene. According to Queen Beatrix, in our 
constitutional system the monarchy functions under the 
protection of ministerial responsibility. Public actions by 
the monarch during a cabinet formation should therefore 
be accommodated more formally under ministerial respon-
sibility. To demonstrate this protection the procedures with 
informateurs would have to be restricted and the formateur 
could be nominated by the Second Chamber.46 
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Transparency and inspiration from 
European integration
Sometimes, the link between the election results and the 
composition of the new cabinet seems inscrutable to the 
electorate. In 1977 the largest party, the PvdA, was excluded 
from the cabinet, which comprised cda and vvd. More 
recently, in 2002, when the PvdA, led by Wouter Bos, made 
dramatic gains in the election, ﬁnishing just behind cda, 
an attempt to form a cda-PvdA coalition ended in failure. 
Balkenende then considered a cabinet of cda, vvd and D66, 
even though D66 had taken a battering. Usually, cabinet for-
mations take a long time and make very little sense to the vot-
ers. The negotiations take place behind closed doors. What 
is the point of holding elections if the real choices are not 
made by the voters but in the horse-trading that precedes 
the formation of a cabinet? It is also important to realize 
that too much transparency can slow down the process, as 
it limits the willingness to compromise. The blame for the 
anomalies in cabinet formation does not lie with the mon-
arch, but with the (divisions within and between) the politi-
cal parties, who would do well to get together and agree on 
a programme before the elections so that the voter knows 
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exactly how they will govern if elected. Alternatively, the 
electoral system could be adjusted in line with the British 
model, where the party with the clear majority is returned 
to power.
Even though the monarch has very little decisional scope, he 
or she can still appoint ministers without formal participa-
tion by Parliament. In the future, openings must be created 
for the explicit involvement of Parliament in the ‘investiture’, 
the vote of conﬁdence in a new government. People often 
draw attention to the democratic deﬁcit in the European 
Union, but the involvement of the European Parliament in 
the investiture of the European Commission follows a more 
democratic process than the formation of the Dutch Cabinet. 
Since the Treaty of Nice the Commission members have been 
appointed by the European Council (comprising heads of 
state and government) for a period of ﬁve years (Article 17 (3) 
teu), but the European Parliament is able to inﬂuence the 
composition of the Commission, as appointments cannot be 
made until the Parliament has approved ﬁrst the nomination 
of the president and then the entire College. Only then can 
the Council make appointments (Article 17 (7) teu). 
One exciting development is that the candidates for presi-
dent and then the commissioners (who are nominated by 
the member states) must appear before the European Parlia-
ment. The President of the European Parliament ﬁrst asks 
the candidate for the ec presidency to set out his general 
policy. A debate and a vote then follow, after which the 
nominees appear for the separate commissions empow-
ered by the European Parliament. In October 2004 the Euro-
pean Parliament used political pressure and threatened to 
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scupper the entire procedure in order to force prospective 
president José Manuel Barroso to withdraw his proposed 
Commission because of discriminatory comments about 
homosexuals from candidate commissioner Buttiglione.47 
In the Netherlands the cabinet has already been appointed 
by the monarch before it reads its policy statement in Par-
liament. Conﬁdence in the new cabinet is demonstrated by 
the fact that most of the motions from the opposition are 
voted off by the coalition. Accordingly, it might be worth-
while to consider the Belgian example and introduce a vote 
of conﬁdence.48 
Because of European integration it was possible for a welfare 
state like the Netherlands to survive after the loss of Indo-
nesia, and the Dutch economy, especially the carrying and 
transhipment trade, has proﬁted from the advantages of 
the free market enormously. Rotterdam is the biggest har-
bour in Europe and Amsterdam Schiphol Airport is seen as 
the gateway to Europe. The powers of the government have 
been enhanced by European integration, but the power of 
the monarch has not really proﬁted from this development. 
This is because the responsibility for governing the coun-
try rests with the cabinet on behalf of Parliament. Since 
World War ii the monarchy has evolved from an institu-
tion of power into an institution of conﬁdence. In that light 
one could argue that with the weakening of the meaning 
of national borders because of European integration, the 
importance of the monarchy in its function as a symbol of 
national identity has grown. While politicians come and go, 
the Royal Family is always there. In the Netherlands it is pos-
sible to abolish the monarchy by an act of parliament, but 
in the near future the monarchy will remain a highly visible 
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institution. The process of European integration is not seen 
as seriously threatening the Dutch monarchy. The authority 
of the monarch is not spelled out in the Constitution, but 
depends on personal credibility that needs to be constructed 
by the monarch and the government together. Therefore the 
relationship between the monarch and the prime minister 
is crucial, also for the monarch. Queen Beatrix has shown 
that she does not rely on the splendour of the regalia and the 
mystique of royalty. She treats her function as a profession 
among others.49 But because of the monarchical design of 
the old Dutch Constitution, the monarchy is still an impor-
tant part of the constitutional identity of the Netherlands, 
and this identity has to be respected by the European Union 
according to eu Law (see Article 4 (2) of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon). 
European integration, including the membership of the 
Council of Europe and the European Union, has made the 
citizens of the Netherlands more aware of the importance 
of human rights and democracy. In the Copenhagen Criteria 
(1993) we ﬁnd the political criteria under which applicant 
states could apply for membership. These political criteria 
required states to have ‘stable institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for 
and protection of minorities’. Can the European Union apply 
standards of scrutiny to other states that it does not apply to 
its own Member States? Many proposals for constitutional 
reform to make Dutch constitutional law more democratic 
failed because of the necessity of a two thirds majority in 
both houses of parliament. But it is even possible to make 
the cabinet formation in the Netherlands more democratic 
and transparent without changing the Constitution.
53
10
Conclusion
It is known that Queen Beatrix does not like Member of Par-
liament Geert Wilders and that she was possibly attempt-
ing to prevent the formation of a right-wing coalition that 
included him. On 7 July 2010 Thomas Landen stated that 
the maneuvers to exclude Mr. Wilders had angered ordinary 
Dutchmen. Many voters could be heard complaining: ‘What 
is the use of going to vote when we are not listened to any-
way?’ The general elections in the Netherlands in June 2010 
resulted in a victory for the right. The Dutch Constitution, 
however, grants the Queen the power to appoint a person 
(or persons) of her choice to initiate and direct negotiations 
for the formation of a government coalition. By appointing 
the Labor politician Herman Tjeenk Willink to the position 
of formation facilitator (informateur), the Queen had made 
it clear that she probably wanted a coalition that included 
the Labor Party and excluded the Freedom Party of Geert 
Wilders. Following the elections, Mr. Wilders said: ‘We want 
to be part of the new government. More security, less crime, 
less immigration, less Islam – that is what the Netherlands 
has chosen … I don’t think other parties can ignore us.’ 
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Wilders seemed, however, to have overlooked the power of 
the monarch. For months, rumors had been circulating that 
Queen Beatrix had postponed resigning in favor of her son, 
43-year old Prince Willem-Alexander of Orange, until after 
the 2010 elections because she wanted to thwart Mr. Wilders’ 
governmental ambitions. Although unelected, the Dutch 
monarch plays the decisive role in the government forma-
tion, and can bypass the electorate. Afshin Ellian, a profes-
sor of law at Leiden University, criticized the Queen for her 
role in obstructing a right-wing government. Ellian wrote 
on his blog. ‘Queen Beatrix,’ he said, ‘has lost her imparti-
ality in the eyes of many right-wing Dutchmen, the major 
winners of the past elections, namely the vvd and the pvv, 
have not been able to play a decisive role in the formation of 
a new cabinet’ (www.hudson-ny.org/1400/dutch-establish-
ment-rejects-election-results).
On June 9, 2010, the Liberal vvd won 31 of the 150 seats in 
the Dutch House of Representatives, compared to 22 in the 
2006 general election, and became the largest party in the 
parliament. The largest winner of the election, however, was 
the pvv of Geert Wilders, which won 24 seats, compared to 
9 in 2006. The parties of the resigning center-left coalition 
of Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende suffered consider-
able losses, collapsing after a row over military involvement 
in Afghanistan. cda fell to 21 seats from 41; the Labor Party 
fell to 30 seats from 33; and the Christian Union fell to 5 seats 
from 6. 
According to Thomas Landen the electorate’s major swing to 
the right allowed vvd-leader Mark Rutte to form a govern-
ment with Mr. Wilders’ pvv and the Christian-Democrats. 
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This coalition would have 76 of the 150 seats and could count 
on the support of the small right-wing Protestant party sgp 
(2 seats). Such a vvd-pvv-cda coalition was that preferred 
by Mark Rutte. As this coalition would, however, be critical 
of immigration, multiculturalism, Islam, and the centrali-
zation projects of the European Union, while also being one 
the most pro-Israeli governments in the world, the Dutch 
political establishment was dreading a Rutte-Wilders cabi-
net. 
By appointing Herman Tjeenk Willink (Labor Party) as her 
informer and representative in the coalition talks, Landen 
assumed that the Queen seemed to make it clear that she 
wanted Labor to be part of the coalition. But before the elec-
tions, Labor had explicitly stated that it would never form a 
government with the pvv. With the Labor politician Tjeenk 
Willink in the key role, it seemed obvious that the Queen 
seemed to direct the Netherlands towards her own prefer-
ence: a centrist coalition of Liberals, Laborites and Chris-
tian-Democrats. Such a coalition would have 82 seats. The 
elite of the Left and the regents absolutely want to avoid the 
risk of a cabinet with Wilders, wrote Prof. Ellian. ‘Wilders 
has been preliminarily excluded without the elite even con-
sidering negotiations with him.’ Ellian further pointed out 
that this is not just an injustice to Mr. Wilders, but also 
to his 1.5 million voters ‘who have been excluded from an 
important political process without as much as one relevant 
argument.’ 
But in the end things worked out quite well for Mark Rutte, 
the leader of the Liberal vvd party. In October 2010 Queen 
Beatrix asked him to form a minority cabinet with the 
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Christian Democrats (cda), a centre-right coalition backed 
by the Freedom’s Party (pvv) of Geert Wilders, but with 
Wilders and his party remaining outside of the government, 
although he had won the third biggest share of seats in par-
liament. 
There is no cause for alarm – thanks mainly to the steward-
ship of Queen Juliana and Queen Beatrix. Over the years 
their impartiality has strengthened government stability in 
the Netherlands. The notion of a monarch guided by advi-
sors rules out any question of entrenched positions in the 
process of cabinet formation. In that sense the monarch is 
an important part of the government system guarantee-
ing continuity and experience at the highest level. This 
impression serves the general interest. Because the Neth-
erlands is a country of minorities, who favour the elective 
system of proportional representation, ﬁxing a government 
agreement can be very complicated. The ‘caretaker’ period 
after a cabinet has resigned can take quite long. Given the 
increased powers of the parties and party leaders in the Sec-
ond Chamber – who have a considerable say in the coalition 
agreement – the democratic deﬁcit in cabinet formation in 
the Netherlands does not mean that the government system 
is autocratic. Although the monarchic form of government 
in the Netherlands is not undisputed, most political parties 
will not start a fundamental debate because of the historic 
ties between the Netherlands and the House of Orange. This 
could change with the increasing popularity of the populist, 
Geert Wilders and his pvv50. 
But, should one, just because things work out in practice, 
resign oneself to the fact that the situation in the Nether-
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lands is not entirely constitutional, elective or democratic? 
In the Netherlands the cabinet formation takes too long. The 
independent and inviolable king chooses informateurs and 
formateurs and formulates their instructions. Why can the 
Second Chamber not elect the formateur after the elections? 
Unless the formateur joins the new cabinet, neither the infor-
mateur nor the formateur is accountable to the Second Cham-
ber. Thom de Graaf, a former leader of D66 (Democrats 66), a 
more radical liberal party in the Lower House, said:51
‘In this day and age every act of government demands 
transparent accountability and democratically legitimized 
authorization. The principle of protective ministerial 
responsibility does not alter the fact that royal powers of 
governance are neither necessary nor desirable in a modern 
monarchy. The formation of a cabinet can hinge on deci-
sions which have profound implications for the question of 
which coalition is returned to ofﬁce. In such decisions min-
isterial responsibility can, in any case, only be artiﬁcially 
construed after the event.’
The formal involvement of Parliament in the formation of 
the cabinet should be more clearly expressed constitution-
ally. Citizens need to be made more aware that the institu-
tions that derive their mandate from democratic elections 
should also call the tune. Regrettably, the importance of the 
election of government ofﬁcials is underestimated in the 
Netherlands. Precisely because hereditary rights have no 
place in egalitarianism, the formation of a cabinet should 
be organized more democratically and enshrined in (con-
stitutional) law. This would also be in the interest of the 
monarch, who otherwise runs the risk of embroilment in 
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political brinkmanship and career promotion. All hints of 
arbitrariness, inequality and regency-monarchical systems 
must be avoided. Out of respect for the principles of the 
democratic state the procedure for forming a cabinet should 
be written into the Constitution and preferably include an 
investiture.52 This is more likely to enhance than undermine 
the authority of the monarch. The procedures leading to the 
formation of the Dutch Cabinet do not sufﬁciently reﬂect 
the principles of constitutionalism and sovereignty of the 
people or the increase in popular and parliamentary power. 
The Netherlands can learn some lessons from the constitu-
tional law of the European Union.
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